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THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS ACT 2013 – AN OVERVIEW
Tony Cunningham
School of Surveying and Construction Management
Dublin Institute of Technology
Bolton Street, Dublin 1

It is absolutely fundamental to trust within the construction industry that participants should
be paid for the work which they have undertaken – Sir Michael Latham (1994, p.93)
In March 2013, the Author of this study published a paper entitled Will the Construction
Contracts Bill Improve Subcontractor Cash Flow? [http://arrow.dit.ie/beschreoth/10/] The
study investigated whether the Construction Contracts Bill, then going through its second
reading in the Dail, was likely to improve payment practice within the industry. The Bill’s
primary aim was to address the perceived widespread practice of late payment and underpayment by main contractors to subcontractors. The study examined the importance of cashflow to contracting companies and explained how main contractors could, by delaying payment
to their supply chain, transfer much of the cost of financing the project onto their
subcontractors; an approach which may cause major difficulties throughout the entire supply
chain.
The study examined the payment provisions of the Construction Contracts Bill as then drafted
and identified a number of serious concerns and weaknesses raised by senior industry figures
and public representatives regarding the application and operation of the proposed legislation.
In the light of these perceived flaws and the lack of success of previous prompt payment
legislation to prevent late and non-payment, the Author argued that the proposed legislation
was likely to have a limited effect in resolving subcontractor cash-flow problems. The Author
acknowledged, however, that change is usually a gradual process and rarely comes about
overnight, adding that the Bill was regarded as ‘a step in the right direction’. He concluded that
it is one thing to change the law; changing the culture is another thing entirely.
This study has been undertaken in the aftermath of the commencement of the Act on the 25 th
July 2016. The study reviews the rationale for the introduction of the Act, examines the Act’s
provisions, reports industry commentary and analysis, and reviews the findings of various
undergraduate and postgraduate studies undertaken on the topic within the School of Surveying
and Construction Management in the Dublin Institute of Technology since 2013.
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Rationale for the Introduction of the Act
‘The Government is committed to protecting small building subcontractors that have been
denied payment from bigger companies’. (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012)
O’Brien (2016) explains that the Act was introduced to combat poor payment practices in the
construction sector generally and particularly ‘tier 2’ and lower tier subcontracts. He observes
that contracts in that sector are often unwritten, and adds that there is often no express
agreement governing payment between the contactor and the subcontractor. He explains that
enforcing payment is difficult in these circumstances and that courts may have difficulties in
interpreting the presumed intentions of the contracting parties. He contrasts these informal
(sub) contract ‘agreements’ with ‘tier 1’ contracts agreed between employers and main
contractors. Tier 1 contracts are typically executed on the basis of standard forms of contract
such as those published by the RIAI (Royal Institute of Architects in Ireland) and the GCCC
(Government Construction Contracts Committee) Public Works Contracts. These contracts are
comprehensive in their coverage of matters which may arise in the course of constructing
building projects and they contain detailed procedures relating to the matters covered by the
Act. O’Brien identifies these matters as those that govern payments, provide a right to suspend
for non-payment, and provide for speedy dispute resolution.
Cunningham (2013) noted, that despite the introduction of prompt payment legislation in 1997
and in 2002, the autumn 2012 Irish Small and Medium Enterprise Association (ISME) SME
Credit Watch Survey revealed that, on average, firms operating in the construction industry
were kept waiting on average 75 days for payment. The recent autumn 2016, Survey reveals
that construction firms still wait 62 days for payment, which although an improvement, remains
a problem, despite the implementation of the Act and the improving economic environment.

The Construction Contracts Act 2013.1
The Act was enacted on the 29th July 2013 and came into force almost three years later on 25th
July 2016. The purpose of the Act is to ‘regulate payments under construction contracts and
to provide for related matters.’ The Act is consists of twelve sections over 10 pages, plus a
single page Schedule. The Sections are: 1 Interpretation; 2 Construction contracts: exceptions
etc.; 3 Payments under construction contracts; 4 Payment claim notices; 5 Right to suspend

1

A copy of the Act is available on-line at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/act/34/enacted/en/html
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work for non-payment; 6 Right to refer payment disputes to adjudication; 7 Right to suspend
work for failure to comply with adjudicator’s decision; 8 Selection of panel of adjudicators; 9
Code of practice for adjudication; 10 Delivery of notices etc.; 11 Expenses; and, 12 Short title
and commencement. These sections are now reviewed in turn.

Section One; Interpretation.
Section One sets out, in alphabetic order, the meanings to be given to the various terms used
within the Act. This is standard practice for legislative enactments. Interpretations are provided
for: “construction contract”; “construction operations”; “executing party”; “main contract”;
“Minister”; “other party” “payment claim”; “payment claim date”; “payment claim notice”;
“payment dispute”; “subcontract”; “subcontractor”, and “work”.
Of particular importance are the definitions covering “construction contract” and “construction
operations” which identify the scope of the Act and which are both very broadly defined.
“Construction contracts” (subject to the particular exceptions set out in Section Two, - see next
subsection) not only relate to ‘typical’ main-contracting and sub-contracting activities and/or
labour-only arrangements, but also include the provision of professional consultancy services
including architecture, engineering, (quantity) surveying and project management among
others. Similarly ‘construction operations’ includes activities ranging from major civil
engineering infrastructure works to every-day activities such as painting and decorating
contracts, and extends to occasional or ‘one-off’ individual projects such as repairing artistic
works attached to real property.
Subsection 3 defines that supply only of building materials, components, equipment and plant
and machinery do not constitute construction contracts.
Commentary
As is the case with much legislation, the Author found the wording in certain passages of the
Act somewhat indigestible, and in places, utterly confusing. For example the opening
definition, of a ‘construction contract’ refers to it as being between an ‘executing party’ and
‘another party’; however, the terms ‘executing party’ and ‘other party’, require further
definition: it is also not difficult to confuse these terms with other expressions, such as ‘other
person’, used within the Act’s text. Commentators may criticise the wording for needlessly
complicating standard industry terminology to identify the principal contracting parties: viz.
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the employer, contractor, subcontractor and sub-subcontractor. Durack (2016) describes the
various definitions and terms set out in this Section as a ‘new language’. Some assistance in
interpreting the Act has been provided by the publication of an information booklet by the
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (2016). Bearing in mind that one of the primary
intentions of the Act is to protect (small) contractors and subcontractors from payment abuse
when carrying out work, it is suggested that the language used in the Act could have been more
clearly drafted and made more accessible with this group in mind2. Confusion generates
uncertainty which in turn may inhibit contractors or subcontractors from availing of their rights
and entitlements afforded by the Act.
Cunningham (2013) noted that one of the main areas of debate in connection with the Act was
whether its scope should be extended to include ‘bespoke’ products manufactured for the
particular project. Indeed, a number of Deputies also called for the meaning of ‘bespoke
products’ to be expanded to include materials such as concrete, blocks and general building
supplies which could not be recovered once incorporated in the Works. Quigg Golden
Solicitors (2013b) reported, however, that the Minister indicated that ‘it had not been
bureaucratically possible to define supplies delivered to a construction site in a way which
would see that category of materials included within the remit’ of the Act. Supply only
contracts, therefore, are not covered by the Act. O’Connell (2014) comments that this exclusion
was justified on the basis that ‘such contracts are already covered by existing legislation’.

Section Two; construction contracts: exceptions, etc.
Section Two identifies the particular exceptions to the general broad scope of the Act noted
above. This Section exempts contracts below €10,000 in value (Section 2. (1 a)). Section 2. (1
b) exempts contracts relating to owner-occupier residences of less than 200m² in area. The
remainder of the Section excludes employment contracts, Public Private Partnership
arrangements, and limits the application of the Act to matters relating to construction where
particulars within the contact relate to matters other than construction operations. Parties to a
construction contract cannot opt out of the provisions of the Act.
Contracts of employment are excluded from the Act.

2

For example see Section 5 (6) regarding the programme implications of subcontractor work suspensions as
particularly challenging
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Commentary
The Act does not apply to small ‘jobbing’ contracts and subcontracts below a €10,000 value
threshold, nor to private residential projects except for so called ‘trophy homes’ over 200m2 in
area. According to the Department of Public Enterprise and Reform (2011) the drafters of the
2011 Bill (and presumably the subsequent Act) considered that including small commercial
and domestic residential projects within the scope of the legislation would to impose a
disproportionate burden on the contracting parties. (DPER, 2011) and substantially reduced the
original thresholds to the €10,000 level. These exclusions, nevertheless, appear capable of
producing somewhat incongruous scenarios/conditions, for example the main contractor on a
typical owner-occupier project may be excluded from the operation of the Act while the ‘larger’
subcontractors would be covered by the Act but the smaller ones would not. Similarly the
exclusion of PPP contracts relates to their top tier only.
Cunningham (2013) reported industry concerns, at the time of the Bill debate, regarding the
two threshold exemptions, quoting sources advocating that the Act should ‘apply to all
construction contracts’; … and noting that … ‘that the residential market is where a lot of the
problems arise’. Quigg Golden (2013a) comment that the €10,000 threshold remains
‘problematic’ adding that ‘there are principled objections to having any threshold at all’. They
question whether a contract initially below the €10K threshold becomes subject to the Act if
variations and other contractual claims results in the contract value exceeding the threshold.
Similarly, they question whether the Act applies where a main contactor’s contra-charge
reduces a subcontract value below the €10K threshold with the result that the ‘dispute could
not be adjudicated upon’, concluding that the current provisions ‘will be sure to attract High
Court litigation’. As in other areas of life boundaries (thresholds) can cause difficulties.
Martin (2016) is of the opinion that the threshold exemptions run contrary to the Act’s original
objectives; - to protect subcontractors, particularly small subcontractors. He notes, however,
that in many if not most cases, these small-scale contracts would be completed within ‘1 to 2
months’ – a period which he relates to the UK HGCR3. Act’s 45 day exclusion period. He also
raises suspicions that unscrupulous contractors might attempt to circumvent the legislation by

3

The Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.
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splitting large contracts into packages below the threshold exemptions thereby removing the
protections offered by the Act.
With regard to the residential construction threshold, Martin (2016) reports CSO 2014 planning
permission statistics which record that of the 6,626 permissions granted, that 3,096 of these
were for one-off housing whose average floor area was 244.8 m2 – indicating that a large
proportion of this type of development would be within the scope of the Act. He contrasts this
provision with the current corresponding UK legislation which exempts all owner-occupier
residential development.
Martin (2016) investigated the reaction of four small, four medium and one large sized
contracting organisations4 to the threshold exemptions and discovered, somewhat to his
surprise, that only one of his participants expressed concern regarding the €10,000 threshold.
He reported that the other eight participants regarded the exclusion as ‘fair’ as they would not
normally, if ever, work on contracts below this threshold. Martin reports that the participant
who expressed concern added that ‘he had never worked on a subcontract with an actual
written contract in hand’. Regarding the residential threshold, again, eight of the participants
expressed no issue with this exclusion. Martin reports that his all of his interviewees support
the inclusion of the 200m2 threshold within the Act’s scope. He reports their comments that
employers in such contracts are often ‘benign’ ‘self-builders’ and that they ‘almost always have
the money to make these payments’ Two of the interviewees commented that the location of
the project was perhaps a more important determinant of value than the 200m2 threshold, one
observing that ‘working on a large city centre terrace home in Dublin … would easily exceed
the value of most 200m2 self builds in any rural location, due to the complexity of this type of
work alone’. His commentary also supports the contention that many projects under €10,000
would not normally be in writing and the Act’s provisions would be beneficial in these
instances.
Byrne (2017), on the other hand, found that all seven of his interviewees coming from a
contracting background disapproved of the residential exemption. He quotes one of his
participants “the residential market, in particular, the one-off area can be a dangerous area to

Martin classified his small contractor participants as those with a turnover of less than €1,000,000, medium as
those with a turnover in excess of €1 million to €15 million. His large contractor is an international organisation
with a turnover in multiples €100.million.
4
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be involved in, primarily because they involve the least number of professionals, … which
means they have the least amount of guidance on how to behave with contractors, I believe this
leaves contractors exposed.”
O’Connell (2014) regards it as ‘very significant’ that the parties cannot opt out of the Act’s
provisions. She notes that where a contract falls within the definition of a construction contract
that the Act’s provisions ‘automatically apply’, adding that if a contract ‘fails to conform to the
legislation, the provisions of the Act are automatically incorporated’. She adds that where a
contract’s provisions conflict with the Act, that the Act will take precedence. She concludes
that the inability to contract out of the Act ‘is a central feature of the legislation’. Fenelon
(2016), reinforces this point, informing us that ‘it is illegal to say that the Act does not apply
in a contract’.

Section Three; Payments under construction contracts.
Subsections 3 (1) and 3 (2) regulate payment arrangements under construction contracts and
requires these either to set out the amount of each interim payment and, the final payment, or
provide an adequate mechanism for calculating the amount of these payments. The contract
must also establish the payment claim date(s) or set out a mechanism for determining such
dates, and must also identify the periods within which these payments must be honoured.
Subsections 3 (3) and 3 (4) identifies a ‘Schedule’ which applies to main contracts ‘which do
not include the subsection 3 (1) and/or (2) (above) provisions.’ The Schedule also applies to
subcontracts unless the particular subcontract contains ‘more favourable’ mechanisms for the
subcontractor than those provided for in the Schedule. The Schedule provides that payment
claims be made 30 days5 after the commencement of the contract and at 30 day intervals
thereafter until substantial completion is achieved. The final payment claim is to be made 30
days following final completion. On short duration contracts, not exceeding 45 days, the
payment claim date is to be 14 days following completion of the work. Payments become due
30 days after the payment claim date.
Subsection 3 (5) prohibits the use of ‘pay when paid’ arrangements except in the limited
circumstances set out in subsection 3 (6) which involve employer insolvency.

5

‘Days’ refers to calendar days – see Section 10 below for further commentary.

7
7/3/2017

Commentary.
Section 3 of the Act regulates the timing of payments.
The primary objectives of the Act are to free up cash-flow within the industry by ensuring
timely payment, improving communication regarding deductions from payment claims, and
providing mechanisms to enforce payment entitlements. Section 3 addresses the first of these
objectives by requiring an adequate payment mechanisms for main contracts and setting
statutory maximum payment periods of 30 days for contractor to subcontractor, and
subcontractor to sub-subcontractor payments. It may be said that this Section and the following
Section Four represent core objectives of the Act.
Durack (2016) suggests that the Act may be better described as the ‘Construction Payments
Act’. Employers must now set out the dates for, and amounts of, each interim and final payment
(stage payments) or provide an adequate mechanism for establishing the relevant dates and
calculating the corresponding payments. These provisions will require a schedule of payments
to be prepared such as that illustrated in Table 1 below for many main contracts and all
subcontracts.

Commencement Date Monday 1st August 2016
Claim Number

Payment Claim Date

1

Wednesday 31st August

2

Friday 30th September

3

Sunday 30th October (in effect this would
become the 1st November as the 31st October is a
Bank Holiday)
Table 1 Schedule of Payment Dates – Adapted from Durack (2016)

The maximum statutory payments periods are set out in the Schedule which, while typically
applying to subcontracts, may nevertheless apply to main contracts between an employer and
a contractor in the unlikely event that they do not include an adequate payment mechanism in
their contract. Eugene F Collins Solicitors (2013) comment that most formal contracts (i.e.
main contracts) provide for set payment arrangements in any event, and Curtin (2016) is of the
opinion that the implementation of Act may have little noticeable impact on payment
procedures at main contract level. O’Connell (2014) notes that the legislation permits
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‘employers to agree/impose periods of time for paying the main contractor which exceed those
noted in the Schedule.’
Subcontracts, on the other hand, are subject to the Schedule 30 day payment intervals unless
‘more favourable’ terms are secured. What constitutes more favourable terms, is a matter of
commercial judgement and may include agreements where longer payment terms are accepted
in exchange for concessions such as making advance payments; or payments for materials on
or off site, or reduced retention levels, etc.
Prohibition of Pay when Paid Arrangements
Section 3.5 of the Act prohibits the use of ‘pay when paid’ arrangements except in limited
circumstances involving employer insolvency. O’Connell (2014) comments that ‘where a
contract attempts to make a payment conditional on the actions of a third party, such provision
is deemed ineffective. Arthur Cox Solicitors commenting in 2012 described the prohibition of
all conditional payment provisions as a ‘key change’, commenting that
This provision will bring to an end to the process whereby the risk of a default by an
employer is passed on to subcontractors. The legislature has sought to deal with the
issues in an expansive fashion, hence the language used in the provision is very broad.
Not only does this language prohibit “pay when paid” and “pay when certified” [see
below however], it also extends to instances where a contractor might seek to make
payment conditional upon securing financing or funding, or a third party satisfying
some other criteria i.e. the reaching of a milestone on a programme. However, this
provision will not apply in an insolvency situation where the “other person” has become
insolvent/bankrupt.
The exception to the prohibition of pay-when-paid clauses arises in the event of a liquidation
of an employer within the contractual chain. This measure avoids the prospect of, for example,
the building client becoming insolvent but the main contractor remaining bound to pay his/her
subcontractors, in full, for the work done during the interim. The measure, therefore distributes
the insolvency risk more widely among the supply chain rather than concentrating it solely on
the main contractor. Following the winding-up of the employer’s affairs the contractor typically
becomes an unsecured creditor and may only be able to recover a small proportion, if indeed
anything, of the outstanding value of the work. Money recovered from the liquidator would
then be distributed pro-rata among the affected subcontractors and suppliers.
Politicians during the 2012-2013 Oireachtas debates described the prohibition of pay when
paid practice as ‘a significant change’ a ‘breakthrough’ and an effective response to a ‘serious
9
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power imbalance in the sector”. However, some scepticism was also expressed: ‘We can make
legislation, but enforcement and breaking what has been a culture for decades … will be a
bigger job.’ (Cunningham, 2013)
O’Higgins (2014) comments that conditional payment provisions are currently ‘widely
provided for in contracts within the Irish construction industry.’ She explains that prohibiting
this practice will, effectively transfer the risk of funding the project onto the main contractor.
In this regard, in 2012, the Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (SCSI) raised a cautionary
note on the ‘pay when paid’ prohibition. The Society claimed that main contractors typically
provide 20% to 25% of the project finance with the balance being funded by subcontractors
and suppliers. They claimed that banning pay when paid clauses, would force contractors to
pay subcontractors before they, themselves, would be paid. Whilst the Society suggested that
prompt payment of contractors is laudable, it warned that the requirement to fully finance
projects could introduce a barrier to entry into the industry, or might limit smaller companies’
ability to compete with larger contractors.
Pay When Certified Arrangements
Despite the apparent intentions of the drafters of the Act to bring to an end the long-standing
conditional payment practice, questions, nevertheless remain regarding whether the current
wording of the Act achieves this end. O’Connell (2014) enquires ‘Whether clauses which
provide for “pay when certified” provisions are acceptable, on the current wording, it is
considered likely they will be permitted, assuming the contract has been drafted appropriately.’
O’Higgins (2014) comments that main contractors may attempt to limit their exposure to the
risk of fully funding the project by making ‘all payments to its sub-contractors conditional on
the receipt of a certificate, in respect of the relevant works, either from its employer’ or the
contract administrator. She comments that the Act’s wording is ‘broadly similar’ to the
corresponding UK HGCR Act, outlawing ‘pay-when-paid provisions … but not expressly
outlawing pay-when-certified provisions6. She notes that the wording of the earlier
Construction Contracts Bill 2010, appeared to outlaw pay-when-certified provisions but was

In the English Durabella case, the judge said the provisions of the HGCR Act, concerning the
exclusion of pay-when-paid clauses, did not affect the position of payment on conditional
certificates (i.e. pay-when-certified).
6
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changed in the Act’s final wording. She concludes that the final wording ‘supports the view
that the Act does not outlaw pay-when-certified provisions.’

Section Four Payment Claim Notices
Section 4 regulates the procedures for claiming and making payment. Under this Section the
claimant must submit a payment claim notice to their employer within five days of the
scheduled payment claim date. The notice specifies the amount claimed, identifying the
relevant period or work stage, the subject matter, and a detailed break-down of the claim. The
default mechanism for calculating the payment amount is set out in the Schedule and represents
the gross value of the work at the payment date less the amounts already paid. If the employer
disagrees with the claimed amount he/she must deliver a ‘response to the payment claim notice’
to the claimant within 21 days of the payment claim date specifying the proposed payment
amount, the reasons for the difference, and the relevant calculations supporting the proposed
payment. If these matters are not settled, the amount stated in the response notice becomes
payable on the scheduled date for payment.
Where a reason for the difference is due to an alleged breach of contract the response must
identify when the loss and damage was incurred, its particulars, and calculations for each such
claim.
Commentary
Section 4 of the Act deals with the administrative procedures involved in making payments.
The formalised payment claims notices and response notices required under Section 4 of the
Act replace the widely practiced ad-hoc and informal approaches to claiming payment. The
new procedures introduce a standardised, uniform approach to manage and administer the
payment process. Figure 1 below identifies the maximum periods for submitting claims and
issuing notices in compliance with the Act.
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Fig 1 The Schedule: Default Administration of Payment Procedure under the Schedule to the
Construction Contacts Act 2013 (Source Quigg Golden, 2016)

Table 2 below develops the previous Table (in Section 3) and includes the deadlines for
Payment Claim Notices, Responses and Payment Dates

Commencement Date 1/Aug/2016

Monday 1st August 2016

Claim Number

Payment Claim Payment Claim Response Date
Date
Notice Date

1

Wednesday 31st Monday
August
September

2

Friday
30th Wednesday 5th Friday
September
October
October

3

Sunday
October

30th Friday
November

Payment Date

5th Wednesday 21st Friday
30th
September
September
21st Sunday
October

30th

4th Sunday
20th Tuesday
29th
November
November

Table 2 Schedule of Payment Dates – Adapted from Durack (2016)

Applications for payment are now to be presented in the form of a ‘payment claim notice’.
These provide employers and/or contract administrators with the prescribed information and
calculations on which to base their payment to the contractor. If the employer agrees to the
amount claimed the contractor will be paid in full at the end of the 30 day cycle. Hughes (2016)
12
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regards these notice requirements as ‘very important’ and explains that their procedures ‘must
be strictly followed when pursuing or defending a payment claim, otherwise, the claim or
defence thereof will fail.’ He stresses that the ‘notice is clear, because if it is not, the party
claiming the amount may not be able to rely on the notice in circumstances where it alleges
that the other party did not deliver a proper response to the payment claim notice’ In this
regard, the Department of Jobs Enterprise and Industry has published a sample payment claim
notice and response to payment claims notice are available at the footnote link below.7
Hussey (2016) reinforces the importance of the response to claims notices, warning employers
that ‘failure to respond as required by Section 4 could result in the paying party having to pay
the full amount claimed by the executing party no matter how outrageous the claim.’ He adds
that the contractor is entitled to payment, provided the claim conforms to the Section 4
procedures and that the employer must respond if he/she disputes the claimed amount. He later
refers to the practice known as “smash and grab” adjudications where a contractor, usually,
towards the end of a project lodges a ‘very substantial claim’ on the chance that no response
will be made within the twenty-one day period. Hussey warns that ‘if he gets no response within
that period he is then entitled to payment and is in a very strong position to enforce payment
through adjudication if necessary.’
The amount payable depends on the individual contract’s particulars, whether, for example, the
contract provides that unfixed materials on, and/or off site may be included in the valuation.
Durack (2016) sets out various heads of claim which a payment claim notice might include:
work duly executed; an apportionment of preliminaries including fixed cost items and timerelated costs; adjustments of provisional sums and provisionally measured work; adjustments
of prime cost sums; adjustments for varied work; prolongation or acceleration claims resulting
from delay events for which the client bears the risk; pre-agreed payment for bespoke materials
off site; contractor’s design fees, expenses arising from the contractor’s right of suspension,

7

https://www.djei.ie/en/Search/?cof=FORID:11&cx=009364059844111358480:7y3ck43wrts&ie=UTF-

8&q=Payment%20Claims%20Notice
https://www.djei.ie/en/Publications/Publication-files/Form-2-Response-to-Contested-Payment-ClaimNotice.docx
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and fluctuations. The contract may also permit deductions relating to liquidated damages and
retention to be made. Although it would be unusual for typical claims to contain all these
headings, it can nevertheless be sensed that compiling, and indeed checking, detailed progress
claims is a time-consuming task.
Where the employer contests the amount claimed, he/she must respond with a response to a
payment claim notice (also known as a withholding notice, (O’Connell, 2014) or a ‘pay-less’
notice8 (Quigg Golden, 2016)). Hughes (2016) notes that in the UK, failure to issue a
withholding notice challenging the claimed amount or delivery of a notice which does not have
the required contents ‘results in the amount becoming due and immune from challenge.’ He
adds that the employer ‘will have to pay immediately and wait for the next payment cycle to
contest the next amount claimed’. He concludes Irish courts are likely to follow UK precedent
and that this may cause serious cash flow problems particularly during the final stages of a
contract.
Curtin (2016) comments that while this process might appear to enable the payer to decide
what amount is to be paid, he notes that the response notice process will necessitate a ‘better
scrutiny of interim valuation assessments’. Mulrean (2014) notes that contractor may dispute
the withholding notice by referring the matter to adjudication. The provision affording the
payer the opportunity to set-off money from the (sub)-contractor’s payment claim in respect of
counter-claims for loss/expense and/or damage arising from breaches of contract or ‘any other
claim’ may present particular difficulties in this regard.
Knowles (2002), commenting on the prohibition of pay when paid arrangements following the
enactment of 1996 UK HGCR Act, hinted that some main contractors may have retained their
pay when paid clauses leaving subcontractors to complain that their contract does not comply
with the Act.

Section Five Right to suspend work for non-payment
Section Five of the Act establishes a contractor’s right to suspend work where an employer
fails to pay in full the amount stated in the Payment Claim Notice, unless modified by an
effective Response to a Payment Claim Notice, by the due date. This right is subject to
providing at least seven days’ notice in writing, stating the grounds for the threatened

8

This is the term used in the UK for the corresponding notice under the HGCR Act
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suspension. The notice may be delivered no earlier than the day after the payment was due.
Work may not be suspended after payment has been received or where the disputed amount
has been referred to adjudication under Section 6(2) of the Act.
Where a work suspension(s) causes a main contractor to fail to complete the works on time,
the period of the suspension is disregarded for the purposes of the construction programme,
‘unless the suspension of work is unjustified in the circumstances’. Subsections 5(5 and 6) set
out similar arrangements for subcontracts which are delayed because of a suspension by the
main contractor or other subcontractor(s) acting as employers.
Subsection 5.7 affirms the rights of the various contracting parties to seek damages for losses
caused by an unjustified work suspension.
Commentary
‘Work stoppages will almost inevitably cause delays and disruption to a construction project,
these can become extremely costly and are almost always avoidable’. (O’Sullivan, B. 2014,
p.2)
Work suspensions are unusual on construction contracts.
Hughes, Champion and Murdoch (2015) explain that under common (and by extension, Irish)
law a contractor or subcontractor had no right to suspend work on a temporary basis on the
grounds that the employer was in breach of contract, (e.g. by failing to pay). They add that the
(sub) contractor had to continue working but retained the right to claim damages unless the
employer’s ‘breach was sufficiently serious to justify [the (sub) contractor] in terminating the
contract altogether.’ They add that, ‘unless the contract specifically provided for suspension
of work as a remedy for non-payment’ [as does the RIAI and Public Works Contract Forms
PW-CF 1-6], ‘a contractor who suspended work on the ground of not having been paid would
be guilty of a breach of contract in failing to maintain regular and diligent progress’.
The common law position has now been reversed by Section 5 of the Act. O’Connell, (2014)
considers the introduction of the right to suspend work in the event of non-payment or
underpayment to be a ‘very significant statutory entitlement’. Translated loosely, the Section 5
provisions mean ‘we will not finish the job until you pay us’. This is a powerful threat, and is
not one to be made lightly by aggrieved contractors. O’Sullivan, B. (2014) reports that, in
15
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general, the Section 5 provisions have been well received, however the provisions are not
without their criticisms. He reports 2013 RICS research in New Zealand which scored the
effectiveness of the right to suspend work at 2.87 out of 5; with 17% rating the provision as not
effective at all. The research also revealed that participants were reluctant to utilise the
provisions due to the negative impact suspensions have on business relationships.
Collins (2013), Mulrean (2014) and O’Connell (2014), commenting on the requirement for the
contractor to resume work once the disputed payment has been referred to adjudication, all
consider that this measure ‘has the potential to dilute the effect of a threat of suspension …
[and a] subcontractor would have to continue works whilst the adjudication process was
underway’. Martin (2016) notes that a main (or sub) contractor ‘cannot simply walk off site’ if
they are not paid on time or in full. Aggrieved contractors must comply with the seven days
written notice requirements following the payment due date, stating the reasons for the
threatened suspension.
A contractor/subcontractor is entitled to extra time to complete the works provided the work
suspension is justified. In these instances the employer/employing contractor is likely to
become liable for the additional costs incurred by the aggrieved contractor/subcontractor.
Extra time, however, will not be granted where a contractor/subcontractor is late in completing
the work because one (or more) of its subcontractors has justifiably suspended its part of the
work. In these instances the offending contractor/subcontractor may be liable for the financial
losses suffered by the employer and other members of the supply chain resulting from the delay
and disruption caused by the suspension. This could give rise to significant additional costs.
The question remains, nevertheless, as to whether contractors are prepared to exercise their
Section 5 rights and suspend their work. O’Sullivan, B. (2014) investigated this particular
aspect of the Act. He quotes Sheridan Gold’s (2009) comment that ‘there are various factors
which may make suspension of work an unattractive option. Where the paying party can pay
but is not paying there is likely to be some reason in dispute. This means there is a risk that the
party undertaking the work may turn out to be wrong if it pursues the suspension route.’
O’Sullivan points out that damages in these instances may be ‘heavy’ and must be considered
‘thoroughly before proceeding with a suspension’. His review of work suspensions in the UK
suggests that suspension is used more often as a threat rather than a fact. It is not difficult to
see a contractor’s bluff being called in these situations.
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O’Sullivan’s (2014) research comprised a survey of design team consultancies, professional
and public bodies, and contracting organisations; he received 93 responses to his survey. He
also carried out six semi structured interviews; three with senior officials of main contracting
companies and three with senior officials in subcontracting organisations. The main findings
of his research indicate that:


The majority of survey respondents (57%) had never experienced a work suspension.



More respondents, 30 out of 51, disagreed that the suspension provisions are biased in
favour of the subcontractor.



There was a mixed response regarding the practicality of suspending the work, 31
agreed that the provision was practical, 40 neither agreed nor disagreed, and 25
disagreed.



Regarding suspending work, 11 respondents replied that they would suspend
immediately in the case of a non-payment; 43 would suspend if non-payment became
a regular occurrence; 37 would suspend only if the situation was deteriorating
drastically, while only 5 would never suspend.



19% of the respondents have actually suspended work.



In the event of non-payment, more of the respondents (54) would revert to adjudication
than suspend the work (43).



A very large majority (82) agreed that suspensions damage working relationships, 10
disagreed and 4 neither agreed nor disagreed.



A larger majority (85) felt that suspension would adversely affect future work prospects
with the client.

O’Sullivan (2014) concluded that work suspension is a high-risk response from subcontractors,
particularly from those who depend on repeat business from a limited number of main
contractors. Martin’s (2016) research supports O’Sullivan’s findings in that participants would
only use suspension as ‘a last resort’ and notes that ‘they would need to be prepared to never
work for that main contractor again … [and] … using this option would destroy any future
working relationships’.
Rooney (2016) comments that the seven day notice of suspension requirement is much shorter
than the periods currently included in the Irish standard forms of contract and sub-contract in
common use. Employers, consultants and contractors may be unaware of this whirlwind
timeframe at present and should be reminded of the urgency of dealing with a notice to suspend
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the works. He recommends that the drafters of the standard forms of contract co-ordinate their
suspension provisions with the Act in order to prevent potential confusion regarding this
matter.

Section Six; Right to refer payment disputes to adjudication.
Sections Six of the Act establishes a right of the parties to issue notice at any time to refer a
payment disputes for adjudication. Ideally, the parties will be able to agree a mutually
acceptable adjudicator, or choose a candidate from the Ministerial adjudication panel within
the five-day period following the serving of the notice. Where the parties cannot agree on an
appointment, the chair of the Ministerial adjudication panel will nominate an appointee. The
serving party must then refer the dispute to the adjudicator within seven days of his/her
appointment with a copy of the referral and supporting documentation to the other party. The
decision of the adjudicator shall be delivered within a 28 day period from the date of the
referral, unless a longer period is agreed, (See Fig 2 below). The 28 day period may, however,
be extended by a further 14 days by the adjudicator with the consent of the serving party. The
adjudicator must act impartially in conducting the adjudication and must comply with the Code
of Practice which has been published by the Minister for use in relation to the Act.
Nevertheless, the adjudicator may use his/her own initiative to investigate the dispute(s).
Subsection 6 (10) provides that ‘the decision of the adjudicator shall be binding until the
payment dispute is finally settled by the parties or a different decision is reached on the
reference of the payment dispute to arbitration’ or litigation. Where the parties accept the
adjudicator’s decision it becomes binding and the decision becomes enforceable by leave of
the High Court and can be relied upon in other related legal proceedings. Clerical errors and
‘typos’ contained in the decision, however, are open to correction.
Adjudicators are not liable for their decisions, unless these are reached in bad faith. Each party
bears its own costs and pays the adjudicator’s cost in accordance with the decision. An
adjudicator may resign at any time or have his/her appointment revoked by agreement of the
disputing parties. In both cases the adjudicator’s reasonable expenses are to be paid by the
disputing parties.
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Commentary
[W]here an adjudicator decides that a payment is due, that payment must be made.’ O’Higgins
(2013b)
‘Adjudication may be described as a process whereby an independently appointed neutral,
decides the issues in dispute within a predetermined, usually very short period of time’
(Engineers Ireland, n.d).
‘Adjudication is not (intended to be) arbitration lite.’ (Hutchinson, 2014)

Arthur Cox Solicitors (2014) comment that “Adjudication provides a speedy and cost-effective
means of dispute resolution, with the decision of the adjudicator becoming binding unless and
until it is overturned either by the courts or by an arbitrator, depending on the agreed dispute
resolution procedure within the particular construction contract.” Mr Justice Frank Clarke
(2014) comments that ‘the decision is binding only in the short term sense of requiring specific
payments to be made.’ The option, nevertheless remains open for an aggrieved party to
subsequently refer the dispute to arbitration or litigation.
O’Higgins (2013) commenting on the provisional nature of the decision, suggests that
adjudication may result in ‘rough justice’ but she adds that it ‘provides the parties with an
answer to their differences, and will, hopefully, allow cash to flow, and may well finally resolve
the dispute.’ She identifies the support of the courts as an essential element in the Act to ensure
that the adjudicator’s decisions can be promptly enforced.
The Act’s provisions may be said to adopt ‘a pay now argue later’ approach, which operate a
limited 28 day timetable from referral and is designed to deliver a swift decision, see Fig 2
below. This period may be extended by a further fourteen with the referring party’s consent. A
further period may be sanctioned if both parties are agreeable.
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Day 1: Claimant serves Notice of Payment Dispute:
(S.6.1&2)

By Day 5: Parties (ideally) agree to appoint a mutually
acceptable Adjudicator (from Ministerial Panel if
necessary) (S.6.3)
Adjudicator appointed by Chair of Panel if
contracting parties fail to agree appointment. (S.6.4)
- Timetable now depends on the length of time taken
to appoint the Adjudicator
Claimant must refer the dispute to the Adjudicator
within 7 days appointment. (copied to the other
party) (S.6.5)
Adjudicator has 28 days to reach a decision (S6.6) unless a longer period is agreed - Adjudicator may
also request a 14 day extension of time

Fig 2 – Default Timetable for Adjudication under Section 6

Statistics have been published regarding the performance of adjudication in the UK, originally
by the Adjudication Reporting Centre at Glasgow Caledonia University and more recently by
Construction Dispute Resolution (CDR). The latest edition of Construction Dispute Resolution
Report No 14 – April 2016 (Milligan and Cattanach, 2016) reveals that in the period 2014 to
2015, 439 adjudications were reported to CDR. Almost half of the adjudications (49%)
involved ‘payment’ or ‘withholding / pay less’ disputes. Approximately 60% of adjudications
concerned sums less than sums less than £100,000, with the highest occurrence frequency (over
25%) involving sums between £10,000 and £50,000. The Report indicates that most disputes
were between sub-contractors and main contractors. A large proportion (80%) of adjudications
were conducted on a documents only procedure. 52% of decisions were given within the
prescribed 28 day period, a further 32% within the extended 28-42 day period, while 16% took
more than 42 days to decide. 63% of appointments led to a decision, a further 25% were settled
by the parties, 6% were abandoned, while the remaining 6% were ongoing. 25% of adjudicator
appointments were challenged. The Report also reveals that claimants were successful in 48%
of cases, respondents in 22%, and split decisions were given in 30% of cases. The most
common hourly fee charged by adjudicators was in excess of £200 per hour.
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Reports from the UK indicate that adjudication has a high success rate in resolving disputes.
Hughes et al (2015) report Gaitskell’s (2005) claim that over 80% of adjudication decisions
were accepted by the parties, and Uff’s (2005) opinion that ‘well over 90%’ were settled using
the adjudication approach. These success rates appear to be similar to those achieved by certain
conciliators operating in Ireland (Bond, 2014). Mr Justice Frank Clarke (2014) makes the
following comments which may explain the success of adjudication in settling disputes. ‘If the
parties are inclined to think that, by and large, adjudicators get things right, will an affected
party really put a lot of time and effort into a major arbitration to second guess what happened
in an adjudication? … Therefore, to win an arbitration in substance, an affected party will
have to do better than the adjudicator’s award and equally, to lose an arbitration, a party will
have to do worse than that same adjudicator’s award.’. An adjudicator’s decision, therefore,
is often a powerful indicator of the likely outcome of an arbitration or litigation action.
The right to seek adjudication under the Irish Act does not prevent the disputing parties from
utilising other non-binding or consensual forms of dispute resolution (e.g. conciliation).
Similarly the Act does not prevent the parties referring the dispute to finally-binding tribunals
such as arbitration or litigation. Quinn (2013) argues, however, that litigation and arbitration
are tedious and expensive processes and that contractors do not wish to have funds tied up for
an extended, indefinite period while awaiting a resolution. He concludes that ‘adjudication
offers a speedy resolution of a dispute which will allow both parties to recover, or pay damages,
but more importantly progress with the project’.
From the specialist subcontractor’s perspective Kelly (2016) argues that adjudication is not a
‘panacea’ for all construction disputes but he argues that it is ‘a big improvement.’ He remarks
however, that the Act’s provisions ‘do not mean that the floodgates are opened for
adjudications of every dispute, and suspending works on multiple sites. He argues, that
adjudication is a quicker and cheaper form of dispute resolution and that the Act’s procedures
should foster better behaviour among contracting parties, adding that the protections/sanctions
contained in the Act may persuade parties to come to the table. Kelly nevertheless urges
claimants to exhaust dialogue before referring disputes to adjudication where decisions can be
unpredictable, particularly in complex disputes. In particular he advises against the tactic of
‘ambushing’ adjudicators with multiple simultaneous disputes or with complicated convoluted
disputes aimed at forcing a rushed decision from the adjudicator. He also disapproves of the
practice of submitting exaggerated claims, and the failure of the parties to acknowledge their
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own weaknesses in a case. He notes that adjudicators ‘may find a route to provide a fair
decision’ in these circumstances.
Quinn (2013) and Curtin (2016) raise questions regarding the reliability of a 28 day process.
Quinn voices concerns over whether adjudicators can reach safe decisions within the
timeframe, particularly on complicated disputes. Curtin reports (in Byrne, 2017) instances of
adjudications which have lasted over 100 days and maintains that the process ‘isn’t cheap’ –
(it is suggested that this is likely to be so on extended or complicated adjudications.) Curtin
also refers to challenges to the adjudicator’s appointment as a means used by paying parties to
delay the process in order to gain more time to prepare their response/defence. He also voices
concerns regarding ‘rough justice’. Waldron (2016) notes the risks associated with tight timeframes noting that of necessity these lack full procedure and safeguards, and present difficulties
in developing detailed arguments. Critics of the approach may argue that swift, but faulty,
decisions may lead to a miscarriage of justice, particularly if the adjudicator’s decision remains
unchallenged by the weaker party.
A serious abuse of non-binding dispute resolution techniques occurs where the paying party,
while engaging in the process, has no intention of paying. This approach is intended to
intimidate the claimant by stalling payment as long as possible and by escalating the cost of
resolving the dispute at each stage in the process. The objective is to force the claimant to
abandon the process. Mr. Justice Frank Clarke (2014) comments: ‘if someone does not want to
pay and there are ways in which they can delay the system, they will try to delay the system.
That is a given. … that system should not allow people who have no real basis for not paying
what the adjudicator has decided, to delay payment by stringing out the process and, thus
defeating the whole point of the timely payment principle ... .’ In these instances adjudication
will add to the overall cost and time taken to resolve the dispute. Critics of non-binding
resolutions may argue that “it is soft justice, nothing more than an additional layer of cost in
the litigation stream. …’ (Law Reform Commission, 2010).
Quinn (2013), on the eve of the publication of the Act, carried out a survey regarding the
adjudication provisions of the Construction Contract’s Bill, which received 51 responses from:
dispute resolution practitioners (32%); main contractors (24%); other construction
professionals (22%); representatives of public bodies (13%) and subcontractors (9%). His
survey revealed that there was a strong preference for consensual dispute resolution
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approaches, particularly negotiation and conciliation. His respondents ranked negotiation,
mediation, conciliation, in that order, as the three most effective resolution approaches; while
adjudication, arbitration and, finally, litigation were considered to be the least effective
methods. The survey revealed that the majority (75%) of disputes involved clients and main
contractors, while main contractor versus sub-contractor dispute (18%) made up most of the
balance. The respondents ranked the reduced time and cost of resolving the dispute as the most
important reason for the introduction of adjudication provisions. Over two thirds of the
respondents had no actual experience of adjudication, but of those who had, all bar one,
expressed their experience of the method as ‘positive’. The primary aim of Quinn’s research
focussed on whether adjudication would be successful in resolving payment disputes. His
survey revealed mixed opinions on the matter: 5.5% replied that decisions would ‘always’ be
referred to arbitration or litigation, 41.8% felt that the majority of decisions would be referred,
43.6% that a ‘minority of decisions would be referred,’ and 1.8% replied that decisions would
‘never’ be referred. The remaining 7.3% ‘other’ classification produced the following pertinent
insights:


‘Small disputes will stop at adjudication but where large sums are involved, parties
will proceed to arbitration/litigation.’



‘Unless very large sums are involved the potential liabilities for costs of
arbitration/litigation will nearly always bring into focus the benefit of reaching a
settlement.’

In concluding the survey Quinn’s respondents were asked for their opinion of the proposed
legislation. 21% replied that it legislation would be ‘very effective’; 49% that it would be
helpful; 12% of little use; 14% that it would make no difference, and 4% claimed it could be
‘damaging’. One respondent commented ‘the existing arrangements for conciliation in all the
standard forms of contract are, in my experience, very successful and definitely superior to
what is now proposed. Their replacement by the proposed adjudication would be damaging’.
Hession (2014) investigated attitudes of eight experienced construction professionals,
regarding the effectiveness of the adjudication provisions of the Act. He found that the
participants were ‘not entirely satisfied’ with conciliation, the ‘incumbent’ initial dispute
resolution procedure required by the RIAI and Public Works Forms of Contract. The
interviewees noted the lack of finality, the exposure to the use of delaying tactics, and the
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susceptibility to incur significant costs even in advance of the hearing as particular flaws
associated with conciliation. They referred to conciliation as ‘toothless’, ‘lasting 18 months
without being resolved’ and ‘costing €500,000 to date’. With regard to the implication of
€10,000 exclusion threshold depriving subcontractors of the recourse to adjudication, most of
the interviewees suggested that the exclusion would ‘cause issues’ and should be removed. On
the other hand they were ‘in the main … happy that adjudication under the Act related to
payment-only disputes’. Regarding the 28 day timeframe for adjudication decisions ‘all
participants agreed that the timeframe was adequate’. The interviewees ‘generally … felt that
business relationships could withstand the impact of a dispute due to the short time frame
involved, however fears of being ‘blacklisted’ and suffering ‘afters’ emerged during the
interviews. The interviewees held mixed opinions regarding whether the non-binding nature of
adjudication decisions weakens the Act’s effectiveness, with the majority suggesting that it did
not weaken it. Individual participants commented that the non-binding nature of the process is,
in itself, a positive and provides a ‘good early measure’ of the strength of their case, while
others pointed out the potential to refer to arbitration/litigation to delay resolution as
‘water[ing] down the process somewhat’. With regard to bearing their own costs of the
adjudication, the interviewees were unanimous in agreeing that costs are a barrier to action.
‘Costs … inhibit parties from taking a case that they could potentially win.’
Martin (2016) reports criticisms of the wording of the Act restricting adjudication to ‘any
dispute relating to payment’; as being too narrow. He contrasts this with the more inclusive
wording of UK HGCR Act which provides for adjudication on ‘any dispute relating to a
construction contract’. Senator Feargal Quinn, the sponsor of the Act, in an address to students
of the Dublin Institute of Technology (28th November 2013), when questioned on this point,
remarked that practically all disputes involve some disagreement over payment, indicating that
he believes that the legislation is not over restrictive.
William Fry Solicitors (2015) note that parties bear their own legal and other costs in
connection with the adjudication. They add that ‘given that the timescales are short,
adjudication is generally considered less expensive than prolonged litigation. This aspect has,
nevertheless, caused concern among contractors (Hession, 2014 above). A quantity surveyor
participating in Hession’s investigation had this to say:
“If costs aren’t following the event, it is making it (pursuing or defending a claim)
prohibitive. … [And] will prevent a lot of adjudications going forward. … For example
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if I am right in not paying a subcontractor, and he is putting me to the expense in having
to defend a claim, I will incur costs in addition to allocating my own time to an issue
where I shouldn’t have to deal with it. Why should I have to pay to get justice, if I am
not wrong?

Section Seven; Right to suspend work for failure to comply with adjudicator’s
decision.
This Section provides a contractor with the statutory right to suspend work if the amount due
from the adjudicator’s decision is not paid in full within seven days of the decision. The
administration and enforcement of this provision echoes that in Section Five above, requiring
that seven days advance written notice of the intention to suspend the work must be delivered
to the paying party stating the grounds for the threatened suspension. As with Section 5, a
contractor/subcontractor must return to work once they are paid the amount due or if the
dispute is referred to arbitration or litigation. Likewise, where a suspension of work is justified,
the period of the work suspension will be disregarded as a cause of delay in failing to complete
on schedule.
Commentary
The Law Society of Ireland (2016) points out that the adjudicator’s decision ‘is payable
immediately, irrespective of the fact that the dispute may then be the subject matter of
arbitration or litigation’. If, however, the payment is not made the remedy is an entitlement to
suspend the work, - it is suggested that in practice suspensions are more likely to occur under
this Section of the Act than under Section 5. Hession (2014) comments that effectively it will
be 14 days after the adjudicator’s decision before a party can suspend work on site. O’Higgins
(2014) regards the right to suspend in the event of non-payment of an adjudicator’s award as
‘very important’. She argues, however, that the protection is ‘emasculated’ by the requirement
to cease suspension if the dispute is referred to arbitration or the courts. She describes the issue
of enforcing an adjudicator’s decision that has not been complied with as ‘very uncertain’, and
it is possible that the objective of providing a speedy decision may be ‘undermined by a much
longer process for enforcing that decision.’ Byrne (2017) supports this view, noting that the
suspending party would be ‘out of pocket’ for the period that the decision remains unenforced.
The ability of the non-paying party to prevent a contractor from suspending their work, or
requiring them to return to work, by referring the dispute to arbitration or litigation in effect
means that the contractor is forced to complete the works despite having not been paid. This is
a far from satisfactory outcome. Regardless of the escalation in the cost of resolving the dispute,
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there is the additional risk that the contractor may be involved with an employer who cannot
pay rather than with one who will not pay. Contractors who complete works for near-insolvent
employers may be unable to recover payment for work they have carried out – an example of
‘throwing good money after bad’.
The Act is silent on the matter of how long a suspension may last for and does not deal with
issue of the ability to determine a contract in the event of extended suspensions. Standard forms
of building contracts typically provide a definitive timetable for termination in these
circumstances. This lack of clarity may lead to situations where contractors remain in limbo
regarding what action to take in the circumstances.

Section Eight; Selection of panel of adjudicators.
Section Eight provides for the establishment and membership of a Ministerial panel of
adjudicators. Appointees to the panel hold a five-year tenure which may be subsequently
renewed. The Minister may revoke an appointment and or a member may resign his/her
appointment. Appointees must have sufficient experience and expertise in resolving
construction payment disputes and will be


‘A registered professional as defined in section 2 of the Building Control Act 2007



a chartered member of the Institution of Engineers of Ireland;



a barrister;



a solicitor;



a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators;



a person with a qualification equivalent to any of those specified above obtained in any
EU Member State.’

Commentary
Hession (2014) reminds us that the disputing parties are not obliged to select adjudicators from
the panel, but adjudicators, where selected by both parties, must comply with the requirements
of the Act.

Section Nine; Code of practice for adjudication.
Section Nine provides that the Minister may publish a code of practice governing the conduct
of adjudications.
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Commentary
William Fry Solicitors (2016) comment that a version of the Code published on the 5th July
2016 was superseded by the current version published on 25th July 20169. They summarise the
Code as addressing the procedures for the appointment of an adjudicator; deadlines for the
reaching of decisions; the allocation of the adjudicator’s fees, and the adjudicator’s
responsibilities. They note that ‘decisions must be in writing and unless agreed by the parties,
include reasons.’ Adjudicators may also invite written submissions and hold oral hearings
where appropriate. The Code requires adjudicators to be independent and impartial and be
satisfied that no actual conflict of interest exists. They should be competent to determine the
issues and able to give the adjudication the time and attention that the parties are reasonably
entitled to expect. O’Sullivan, G. (2014) comments that the Code permits the adjudicator to:


Request any reasonable supporting and relevant documentation;



invite written submissions and evidence from either party;



meet jointly with the parties;



carry out site visits, inspections and tests with permission;



appoint other advisors and experts, with notice to the parties, and



give direction on the timetable for the adjudication and set deadlines to the length of
submissions etc.

Section Ten; Delivery of notices, etc.
Section 10 deals with administrative processes explaining how notices are to be issued. Notices
may be delivered by post or by any other effective means. When a notice is due to be delivered
on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank Holiday such notice is deemed to be valid when it is
communicated on the following working day, typically a Monday.

9

Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (2016), Code of Practice Governing the Conduct of Adjudications
under Section 6 of the Construction Contracts Act 2013 https://www.djei.ie/en/Publications/Publicationfiles/Code-of-Practice-Governing-Conduct-of-Adjudications.pdf
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Comment
The Act is otherwise silent on whether ‘days’ refers to calendar or working days. The Section
10 provision indicates that calendar days are the determinants for the various dates identified
by the Act.

Section Eleven; Expenses;
The Oireachtas shall pay the Ministers expenses. This provision requires no further comment.

Section Twelve; Short title and commencement.
Section 12 identifies the citation for the Act and provides for its commencement. This provision
is standard and requires no further comment.

Implications of the Act for the Quantity Surveyor.
Quantity surveyors are relied upon to administer the payment arrangements of their contracts
in a fair and professional manner by clients, colleagues and contractors. Interim valuations
should, therefore be carried out promptly and accurately in order to ensure that contractors are
properly paid, and cash-flow difficulties are minimised. The surveyor plays a key role in the
payment process in recommending the amount to be paid to the contractor. It is important for
surveyors to be aware of and understand the Act’s terms and possess the necessary skill to
administer the contract properly. Failure to carry out their contractual duties or to perform the
role in an impartial manner not only creates unnecessary difficulties throughout the supply
chain but can also damage their professional reputation. Breaches of their contractual and
statutory obligations may, in certain instances, lead to legal proceedings.
The trend towards the professionalization of the industry, evident within recent construction
related legislation and reform measures such as the Public Works Contracts, is continued under
this Act. The Act imposes a much greater emphasis on effective and efficient contract
administration procedures than has previously been the case, particular at the subcontracting
levels of the supply chain. Brian Quinn in a lecture to quantity surveying students in Dublin
Institute of Technology (February, 2017) pointed out that delayed payment is no longer solely
a breach of contract, - it is a breach of statute and as such has entirely different implications.
He described the additional administration as ‘a big step up’ for quantity surveyors.

28
7/3/2017

The Consultant QS (Tier 1 Contracts)
The QS should clearly communicate to the employer, design team and contractor what they
need to do in order to comply with the Act
Regarding the payment provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, ‘tier one’ contracts between
the building client and the main contractor are, with the possible exception of very low value
and ‘jobbing’ contracts, characterised by the use of standard forms of building contract or
purposely drafted ‘bespoke’ contracts. Such contracts invariably contain detailed
‘mechanisms’ relating to the administration of payments, and as such qualify as an ‘adequate
mechanism’ for the purposes of the Act. As a result the Section 3 and 4 provisions will apply
only in very isolated cases. Private sector building contracts are typically arranged on the basis
of the RIAI Standard Form of Building Contract (currently the 2012 issue). Public sector
projects are entered into using one of the suite of the GCCC Public Works Contracts, such as
PW-CF1 (current version 2.1 - 28th June 2016).
The RIAI contract establishes a default 28 calendar day payment cycle which is initiated by
the contractor. RIAI Clause 35 (b) relating to the Section 3 and 4 requirements of the Act reads:
(b) At the period of Interim Certificates named in the Appendix the Contractor shall
(subject to Clause 16(c) of these Conditions) on production of a detailed progress
statement be entitled to receive in five working days unless otherwise stated in the
Appendix a certificate from the Architect of the amount due to him from the Employer,
which certificate shall include any amounts allowed in respect of sub-contracts and the
Architect shall specify and show separately the amount (if any) allowed in respect of
each Nominated Sub-Contractor. Each certificate shall be honoured by the Employer
within seven working days of presentation of same to him by the Contractor. If the
amount certified differs from the progress statement submitted by the Contractor the
Architect, on request, shall give the Contractor an explanation of the difference.
The provisions of the RIAI contract conform to the requirements of the Act, provided the
various participants perform their roles accordingly. The five working day deadline for
checking the contractor’s application (the payment claim notice) and raising an Architect’s
certificate should be sufficient to enable the main contractor to incorporate any adjustments in
the payment application in a response to payment notice to the relevant subcontractors within
the 21 day (three week) deadline. It is also likely that where the employer honours the
certificate within the following seven working day period that this will take place before the
statutory 30 day deadline for paying subcontractors. Because, however, subcontractor payment
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claim notices must be submitted before the contractor’s payment can be finalised, there will be
very little time where money to pay subcontractors will be ‘resting’ in the main contractor’s
account.
The Public Works Contract PW-CF1 has been revised following the commencement of the
Act. The timetable for interim payments is set out in Clause 11 and is abridged as follows
(11.1.1) At each of the periods for interim payment stated in the Schedule, part 1L, if
the amount payable is more than the minimum amount stated in the Schedule … the
Contractor shall give a payment claim notice to the Employer’s Representative, in the
form of an interim statement, [not later than 5 days after the date agreed between the
Parties to be the payment claim date]. … (11.1.3) Within 14 days of receipt of the
payment claim notice the Employer’s Representative shall issue a response to the
payment claim notice to the Contractor in the form of a certificate, sending a copy to
the Employer. … The Employer’s Representative shall issue to the individual named
Specialists, details of the gross and net amount included within the certificate to the
respective named Specialists … (11.1.4) If there is a sum due to the Contractor, the
Contractor shall send an invoice to the Employer for that sum after receiving the
response to the payment claim notice. The Employer shall pay the amount due on the
invoice within 21 days after receiving the invoice. (Author’s emphasis)
PW-CF1 operates a monthly payment cycle significantly longer payment schedule than the
RIAI contract. It should also be noted that the term ‘working days’ used in the previous version
of PW-CF1 has been removed and in the current version (v 2.1. 28th June 2016) the term days
now relates to calendar days. The previous five week payment timetable has been retained in
the current version.
There are a number of issues raised by the PW-CF1 payment schedule. In the first instance the
contract may provide for the operation payment thresholds. Where a contractor does not carry
out sufficient work to reach a threshold, no payment will be made. Nevertheless, the contractor
will be obliged to pay subcontractors promptly in accordance with the Act provided these
subcontracts exceed the Section 2 €10K threshold. Such situations are most likely to arise at
the beginning of, and towards the end of the contract and will require the contractor to finance
the cashflow shortfalls caused by these outflows.
While the fourteen day (two week) payment checking and certification period complies with
the 21day response to payment claims notices required under the Act, it leaves a tight timeframe
for the contractor to issue the corresponding response to payment claims notices to the various
sub-contractors. Even assuming that the contractor’s payment claim notice is submitted to the
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Employer’s Representative on the payment claim date, it must be borne in mind that the a
number of subcontractors will have submitted their payment claims notices (probably several
days beforehand) in order to enable the contractor formulate his payment claim. It is likely
therefore that where the main contract withholding notice (certificate) is made close to, or at,
the deadline and contains cuts, that it may be too late to incorporate these adjustments in the
response to payment claims notice to be issued to the subcontractors. The issue of paid when
certified relates directly to such occasions.
The 35 day payment timetable contained in PW-CF1 implies that, unless the client pays well
in advance of (at least five days before) the payment deadline, the main contractor will have to
pay subcontractors covered by the Act before, itself, being paid by the client.
Regardless of the contract being used, the payment process is likely to become much more
intense than has previously been the case. Contractors will be aware that they must issue
responses to payment claim notices within three weeks (21 days) of the payment claim date
and are likely to press the consultant QS and the Architect for quick payment turnarounds and
for more specific details of and reasons for cuts in the payment claim. Putting valuations ‘on
the long finger’ may no longer be tolerated. As Martin Lang, Director of Main Contracting
with the Construction Industry Federation, remarked ‘What this Act re-introduces is discipline,
it’s as simple as that.’ (Hession 2014) Curtin’s (2016) view regarding the response notice
process necessitating a ‘better scrutiny of interim valuation assessments’ may be repeated here.
Regarding the adjudication provisions of the Act, Waldron (2016) advises quantity surveyors
to be alert to:


The new dispute resolution regime generally and in particular the short time-frames
involved in preparing and responding to claims.



The nature of adjudication so as to advise clients.



The risk of suspension of the works if a client fails to honour an adjudication award.



The advantages and disadvantages of amending contracts or not.



The effect of this on their own terms of engagement disputes clauses. and



The rendering of existing extended dispute resolution provisions as ineffective.
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The Contractor’s Surveyor - Tier 2 and Lower Tier Subcontracts.
The function of the contractor’s surveyor is to ensure that the contractor gains its full financial
entitlement under the contract and maximises the profit on the project. Optimising cash flow is
a key objective in achieving these aim. In the past, main contractors were able to run projects
in a cash positive manner by employing pay when paid arrangements and agreeing extended
credit terms with suppliers and subcontractors. The Act has now outlawed pay when paid and
curtailed the credit (payment) period to 30 days. The Act has therefore introduced a regime
under which the payment cycles for sub-contracts are often shorter than those of the parent
main contract. Curtin (2016) describes these measures as changing ‘everything’ relating to
payment practice at subcontract level. He notes that financing and cashflow implications
brought about by the Act may prompt contractors to review their payment terms with
employers, seek increased banking credit facilities, and review their retention and material
purchasing arrangements.
The Section 4 provisions of the Act have created an additional administrative burden due to
the formalisation of the payment process. This falls primarily on the contractor’s surveyor.
Byrne (2017) refers to Durack’s (2016) view that the Act has made the task of issuing and
assessing payments ‘increasingly procedural and labour intensive’, and that the extent of
information required by the Act in processing payment claims has increased ‘dramatically’.
Byrne also records the concerns of a main contractor in this regard claiming ‘that additional
surveyors or at a minimum more pressure on administrative staff would be required to process
and check incoming valuations, to ensure the correct responses are being issued.’ In this
regard, it may be noted that there are generally numerous subcontractors working on a ‘typical’
project and that the QS may be involved in more than one project at any given time. Delivering
responses the various payment claim notices, specifying the amount proposed to be paid,
explaining the reason for the differences, and providing the basis for calculating the amount to
be paid are all time consuming tasks. It is not difficult to visualise occasions where workload
pressures lead to deadlines for delivering the response notices being missed, and consequently
requiring that subcontractors are paid in full. Quinn (2017) suggests that contractors may resort
to staggering subcontractor payment claim dates in order to avoid payment delays at
particularly busy times. He and Rooney (2016) also suggest that contractors may agree a very
short first payment period with the various sub-contractors in order to synchronise payments
and establish a common date for submitting payment applications. They also advises that, in
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the interest of good contract administration, that payment claim notices and response to
payment claim notices should be issued even if the amount claimed is zero. Durack (2016)
suggests that the contracting parties may operate a 28 day payment cycle rather that the
maximum 30 day cycle, - thus avoiding the irregularity of the monthly calendar. Calendar
management and ‘knowing your dates’ (Rooney, 2016), therefore, assumes a greater
importance in the administration of payments under the Act than was previously the case.
It is suspected that a significant percentage, if not most, subcontracts on substantial projects
are entered into on the basis of the main contractor’s standard terms of business. These
arrangements may need to be amended as a result of the introduction of the Act. There are also
a number of ‘standard form’ subcontracts in use at present the principle ones being:


The Construction Industry Federation and the Sub-Contractors and Specialist
Association Sub Contract 1989 (the ‘White Form’) is designed to be used with the RIAI
form of main contract. Clause 11 provides that the contractor shall apply for payment
on behalf of the sub-contractor giving the sub-contractor at least seven days’ notice
prior to making an application. Payment is normally due to the sub-contractor fourteen
days after the contractor has received a certificate from the architect. This, therefore
amounts to a “pay when paid” form of sub-contract which now contravenes the Act.
The Form provides the subcontractor with the right to charge interest for late payment
and suspend work for up to fourteen days for non-payment and thereafter terminate the
subcontract if still not paid. Disputes are referred to the arbitration.



The CIF Subcontract Forms for use with the Public Works Contracts are published in
two versions: the ‘Domestic Subcontract’ (October 2016) and the ‘NN Subcontract’
(February 2016) which applies to specialist sub-contracts. The payment timetable in
both contracts reflects the 30 day cycle contained in the Act and provides that the subcontractor submits its application to the main contractor for payment on or before the
payment claim date. Payment becomes due within 30 days of the payment claim date.
The Forms provide for suspending work for 15 ‘working’ days in the event of nonpayment and termination if the sub-contractor is not paid by the end of that period.
Disputes are initially referred to mediation, and if not resolved, then to conciliation and
ultimately arbitration.

Curtin (2016) advises contractors to review their contract documentation in order to define the
‘commencement date of the construction contract’ noting that the payment claims and notice
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requirements flow from here. He also advises that the terms ‘substantial completion’ and ‘final
completion’ should be defined in the subcontract documentation. He agrees with Durack that
a schedule of dates of when payment claims are to be made should be produced and he
recommends that contractors prepare a standard response to payment claim notice. He advises
contractors to ‘close off subcontracts when the subcontract reaches completion’ noting that
this decision will require that the final valuation of the works be completed earlier than normal.
Regardless of the Act, contractors seek to maximise the value of their progress applications
and get the payment in as soon as possible in order to minimise project finance costs. The
contractor must ensure that all completed work is included in the valuation. Organising
effective procedures and approaches in-house – by chasing and keeping subcontractor
accounts up to date, and ensuring valuations are submitted on time, are key elements of this
process. Once the initial payment date claim date has been established it is relatively straightforward to schedule future payment claim dates and confirm these in writing. It is also good
practice to tie main contract valuation dates in with site meetings. The contractor's quantity
surveyor should advise all subcontractors of the latest dates by which applications for payment
should be made, and also formally ensure in-house costing personnel provided the necessary
cost information on time to be included in the valuation. Payment dates should be strictly
observed. It is important to remind subcontractors of the agreed dates when their orders are
placed later in the project. Late or incomplete applications may foster an easy going attitude
which may be difficult to correct at a later stage. Late applications often lead to late payment.
It is also essential to ensure that all notices and supporting documentation required by the
contract is provided along with the valuations. This is particularly important when dealing with
the Public Works Contract Forms which contain sanctions, deductions and forfeiture of
entitlements if the required documentation is not provided with the payment claim.

Reaction following Commencement of the Act
The principle objectives of the Act are to ensure prompt payment to (sub) contractors and to
enable payment disputes to be resolved quickly and economically. Byrne (2017) reports broad
support for the Act within the legislature, construction and legal professions and industry
representative bodies, including the CIF. He comments, however, that the Act has received a
more reserved reception among main contractors who may now have to finance a larger
proportion of the works than was previously the case.
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The question remains, nevertheless, whether the Act will be effective. Initial reactions
following the implementation of the Act have been investigated by Byrne (2017). He conducted
9 interviews; four with main contractors, three with subcontractors and two with consultant
quantity surveyors. His discussions suggest that construction participants ‘have not
experienced any significant change to the way they conduct their business or administer the
contracts.’ He indicates that there is a lack of awareness of the legislation and a tolerance of
existing payment procedures among subcontractors. He suggests that certain main contractors
are continuing to pay sub-contractors in the same manner as previously and they do not intend
to alter their payment practice ‘until forced to do so’. A main contractor commented on this
matter: ‘subcontractors we have been dealing with for many years and have excellent
relationships with, it just wouldn’t make sense for them to go back on their side of the
agreement.’ A quantity surveyor remarked, however, ‘things could change quickly once the
word spreads among subcontractors of their entitlements’ and these might involve ‘difficult
conversations down the line with sub-contractors.’
Regarding the Section 4 notice requirements, Byrne’s (2017) research indicates that aspects of
the payment claims notices and response to payment claims notices are currently being
‘overlooked’. He notes that fully compliant notices are not being delivered ‘yet payment
transactions are still being made … [and] there appears to be no penalty’ involved for failure
to submit compliant notices. He reports that consultant quantity surveyors are requesting
notices and responses ‘but are not ‘yet’ insisting on them’.
Regarding work suspensions, Byrne’s discussions support the O’Sullivan, B. (2014) contention
that contractors are reluctant to threaten, let alone initiate, a work suspension because of the
potential damage to working relationships and business reputations. It appears that none of the
participants had either made or received a threat to suspend work since the Act came into
operation. Comments such as ‘if any subcontract carries out a work stoppage with me, they
will be stopped for good’ and ‘they know the consequences and wont risk losing out on work
going forward’ emerged during the interviews.
It appears that none of the research participants in Byrne’s investigation had experience of the
adjudication process nor had any been involved in a referral since the introduction of the Act.
Opinions regarding the effectiveness adjudication were mixed, the speed and economy of the
process relative to arbitration was seen as a positive. However the lack of finality and damage
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to business relationships were also commented upon ‘the fastest way to populate your client
list with ex clients is by means of adjudication.’ The interviews revealed a general approval of
conciliation as a means of resolving disputes.

Conclusion
The Construction Contracts Act 2013, in essence, deals with the timing of, amount of, and
enforcement procedures for payments within the Irish construction industry. The Act was
introduced to redress a perceived power imbalance between main contractors and subcontractors which fostered poor payment practices. The Act establishes a formal payment
process which may be enforced by aggrieved parties who claim they have not been paid on
time or in full, through suspending the works or referring the disputed payment to adjudication.
The Irish construction sector is small and contracts are built in an environment where ‘everyone
knows everyone else.’ This environment may encourage a ‘business as usual’ attitude in which
change may be difficult to achieve. Change can occur where a party can freely exercise their
contractual, and statutory entitlements, however, power imbalances may be such that aggrieved
parties are reluctant to, or fail to, avail of their rights. Early indications suggest this to be the
case, particularly among subcontractors who are aware of ‘not biting the hand that feeds them’
and are not inclined to ‘rock the boat’. There is currently no independent ‘watchdog’ to monitor
whether the procedures required by the Act are actually being observed. If this remains the
case, the Act may be criticised for allowing employers to self-regulate the implementation of
the Act and in the process defeating the purpose of the Act. As such the Act may be accused
of having ‘no teeth’. Poor payment practice is likely to continue among rogue employers as a
result. If the Act is ignored by the groupings to which it applies, the whole endeavour will have
been a pointless exercise.
The call for ‘somebody to do something about this’ may be best addressed to industry
representative bodies who have publicly supported the introduction of the Act. Bodies such as
the Construction Industry Federation, the Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland, and the
Royal Institution of Architects in Ireland have the authority and influence to modify their
members’ practice. Initiatives similar to CIRI may also play a role in promoting improved
payment practice.
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People are slow to part with their money and the world is full of people who do not pay their
bills on time. Reluctant payers will, no doubt, continue to attempt to circumvent or ignore the
legislation. The Act goes some way in addressing payment problems by providing a statutory
footing upon which ‘fairer’ payment arrangement can be based. It is ‘a step in the right
direction’. As noted in the introduction, change is usually gradual; it is one thing to change the
law; changing the culture is another thing entirely.
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